While I agree, essentially, with everything you have said on free will, there are a couple of things I would like to say in the spirit of discussion. You talk for instance, about the raising of one's arm suddenly and in an arbitrary manner. The problem here I think, is that you are talking about a completely hypothetical situation. I agree that 'If that person says nothing before the action, and there is nothing in the context of the situation to give any clue as to the nature of the coming action, in what meaningful way can we say that the action is determined?', but the fact is, it is highly unlikely that this would happen and, if it did it would most likely be the reaction of someone trying to prove to you or I that they have the freedom to move their arm; which would only prove a lack of free will. Also, I do not understand your point that 'To say that my own course of action, in deciding to voluntarily raise my arm, is determined appears to imply a complete knowledge of the entire universe and all its workings, which I perceive as impossible for any creature within the universe. It follows that only the concept of a god, outside all things (including Time and Space) and able to perceive all things and comprehend them in an unending instant, will give any reality to the idea of Determinism in this absolute sense (applied to voluntary human actions as well as physics)'. Why is a god implied by determinism? And, why is a complete knowledge of the universe implied by moving your arm? I'm afraid I simply don't understand this argument (which is not surprising given i am new to philosophy). I will also add that if determinism does hold true (which I suspect is the case, as up till now I have not heard a convincing argument to suggest otherwise) it has no affect on anyone in their daily lives. Interestingly Tolstoy, in one of his philosophical digressions in 'war and peace' discusses this topic with precisely the same example you have used of raising ones arm.

Eric Replies: [Return to Reaction and Comments page] or [Return to Home Page] or [Return to Top of Page]

The point you make, that if someone is trying to prove freewill, then the raising of the arm is not an arbitrary action, I take on board. It's a nice point. The action taken in the example is not arbitrary so far as the agent is concerned. However, because someone doing something has a reason, it doesn't necessarily follow that what is done is determined, there is still a choice to be made regarding whether it is a good enough reason to take the implied action, and the individual is the one who is finding or creating such reasons and making such choices.

Although many of our actions have reasons, the roots and motivations of some choices appear to remain unknown to anybody save the person initiating the action, unless they choose to reveal them. Then again, how often have you asked someone "Why did you do that?" and received the answer "Because I wanted to"? In other words, sometimes there is no reason we can offer, save our own choice, our own free will.

There is another aspect to all this. It seems that we do many things without making any conscious judgement or choice (or perhaps the process of making the choice is forgotten almost in the moment it is made, due to there being no discernible importance to mark out the particular choice from the innumerable choices we are constantly making). I am thinking here of ordinary bodily movements, where it seems we do not have to consciously will the movement to initiate it.

For example, if I'm currently engrossed in reading a book and happen to see a reference to another book in my bookcase across the room, I do not have to consciously think: "I will now stand up and move to the bookcase to get the other book referred to," instead, so it seems to me, I can simply stand up and do it, with little in the way of discernable conscious control. The thought that we want the book is there to motivate the action, but if we are currently engrossed in reading, we can go and get the book from the bookcase without conscious mental effort and even without leaving off reading. Are such actions then determined in some sense? Perhaps so. To make such actions possible, familiarity with surroundings is required, and it does seem as if there is a part of mind concerned with habituation which can "kick in" if we are unwilling to disengage our full attention when it is held elsewhere. We could still argue, though, that we make some sort of choice not to disengage our attention from the interesting text we are reading, and that we wilfully allow the subconscious habituation to take autonomous control and that we are aware of this and withhold a small part of our attention in case of an emergency (we may have earlier moved the coffee table, say, and it now lies in our way to the bookcase).

However this may be, the element of decision involved in taking many of our conscious actions, and the type of actions taken, all appear to rest with the individual, so far as I can see. So long as there is a range of actions available to choose from, it appears to me that the individual is making choices - and that the Choice Process is in fact part and parcel of the essential "I" and contributes to our sense of self. Of course, the laws of physics rule out some choices, but I do not regard this as an objection fatal to the argument.

Perhaps the part of the argument we are examining could be said to revolve around epistemology and determinism? After all, how do we know that something is determined?

The acquisition of knowledge of any kind implies that some things are predictable. Knowledge implies statements concerning events yet to occur, which in fact in every case prove to be accurate when the events actually do come to pass (the establishment of a Law, in other words). All this, in turn, implies determinism in reality. It seems obvious, then, that there is determinism in reality and that such determinism gives rise to knowledge. However, does this conclusion also imply that detailed and certain knowledge about the individual decisions of individual human beings is possible? I think not. Why? Because the determinism we perceive in reality deals with logical fictions - objects and events - and not with processes. The essential "I" is a process, I contend.

This is not to say that the arguments resulting from such determinism (the causal chains we conceive of) cannot be incredibly sophisticated, displaying a high order of complexity. It means, rather, that the kind of predictive arguments which work well with chemical A and chemical B and the predictability of their chemical behaviour cannot be applied to human beings and human behaviour, due to the multitude of ever-changing factors which are a part of the process of sustaining the essential "I".

It is my contention that determinism, in order to be, must be apprehended. In other words, determinism is part of a human understanding concerned with a human apprehension of the meaning of reality, a meaning created by and through our evolution-developed strategy of pattern creation, together with induction and introspection, not to mention a common physiology. It is a mental entity, an abstraction, conceived of through observation, experience, intersubjectivity and inductive logic. It does not exist as a separate entity in reality. If this view of the ontology of determinism is correct, then determinism is mental in nature. If then, there is a determinism dictating human choice and we do not have free will, this determinism, to exist, must be perceived. But the physiology of the human brain, plus the experiences which any individual brain has absorbed, resulting in the essential "I" which we experience as a sense of self, do not make for simple predictability. In other words, if we cannot determine the actions of another, determinism does not exist for individual human actions. Seeing as we cannot have a complete knowledge of any other individual's experiences and how they were dealt with by the individual in question (see the Hawking/Laplace links in the Freedom article). The only way around this (if we want to say that determinism holds for human thoughts, choices and actions) is to propose that some being above such limitations has the necessary knowledge about the individual. This in turn, implies a knowledge of all the factors which go to make up the individual (experiences, genetic influences, the motives for each and every choice, and the sources and causes of such motivations), which in turn implies a complete knowledge and a perfect understanding of all the workings of the entire universe. Such knowledge we usually regard as being beyond human epistemological limits, and thus, a god is implied by such a view.

The point I'm making is that determinism must be perceived. No possibility of proof, no proof of determinism. We can prove determinism in such areas as Physics and Chemistry through pragmatism. We can say that chemical A mixed with chemical B will produce an explosion. We can say that stepping from a tenth storey window will result in a fall. We can claim laws and causes and effects for such events because we can conceive determinism in them. Determinism is evident in such areas, because a perceiver can predict future instances with a confidence which amounts to certainty and receive conformation byway of results fulfilling such expectations of pattern in reality. What we cannot do is predict what a human being will do, unless we so fence him or her around with ifs and buts that choice is eliminated - or, unless we stick strictly to a prediction of habitual behaviour (and even here there is an element of uncertainty requiring ifs and buts). If the actions of human beings are really determined, then they aught to be predictable. Not simply in the odd instance, but in all instances, theoretically at least. But the only type of being capable of perceiving and having knowledge of such a complex and all-encompassing determinism, I contend, would be a god. The knowledge implied by such determinism amounts to a knowledge and understanding of all things existing and of the history and future of all things existing (from atoms to galaxies).

I should add that this argument does not imply that we cannot know anything about the motivations and causes of human actions (although the word "know" is dubious in this context). Because we are all human, and thus share a common condition, we can guess at the future actions of others, based upon our own experiences and our own knowledge of context. But I contend that this is not the same as saying that there is no such thing as free will. Similarly, we can compile statistics, which reveal the most chosen choice from a given set of choices, and we can thus claim to have a knowledge of the most probable action in a given context (although one might claim that the word "knowledge" should be replaced in such a case with the phrase "best guess," seeing as choice is still available to future subjects facing the same set of choices for taking the same set of actions). Yet, none of this, I believe, substantially undermines what I have just said concerning determinism, its nature and its application to an autonomous individual.

Raul Ramirez Writes: [Return to Reaction and Comments page] or [Return to Home Page] or [Return to Top of Page]

I suspect we are in fact talking about two different sides of two different coins! I never wished to say that one's actions could be predicted, this would indeed require some all-knowing being (though not necessarily a god, I will say why I think this later).

I have always thought (though, perhaps not in such clear terms as I do now) that a person ('I') is the sum total of the people he/she meets, certain events, and some innate abilities (though I am not quite comfortable with this word 'abilities'); for instance as far as I know whether we are left or right handed is above our influence, we have no choice in the matter and this will shape things later (for instance it's doubtful whether a left handed person will take up boxing and use an orthodox stance, in this we have no choice). These things will combine to make the person. If this can be held as true, the only real exhibition of free will I can think of would be for a new born baby to stroll around the hospital and choose his parents. I do not see this happening, and so I think on a philosophical level we do not have free will, but also that this has no affect whatsoever on our daily functions and for all practical purposes we have free will (am I contradicting myself here? Ha, ha…probably).

I had thought that this free will problem was less to do with predictability, however, I do not see predictability as that much of a problem. An all-knowing being WOULD be required for determinism to hold, but why should it be a god? If for instance, a team of scientists took a baby from birth and controlled the conditions of it's surroundings and observed it's activities 24 hours a day, I think that quite soon the scientists would be able to predict the way it will act in any given situation with a high level of success. The problem I think with predictability is simply that we cannot observe someone 24 hours a day from day one. For myself, this is not the issue though.

I also assert that the whole reason for someone's action (e.g. the raising of the arm) will rely heavily on everything that comes before. It is true that at a point in time I will have a choice, A (raise my arm) and a choice, B (don't raise my arm) but I don't see why the choice made is not predetermined; whether I choose A or B will still rely on this 'sum total' that I mentioned earlier (which we have no choice in if we follow the causal chain back to day one) and if there was an omniscient observer who had been watching me from day one I think he would probably be able to divine which choice I would make.

For myself, I find the 'innate abilities' the most interesting part of this question. That is, how much of an influence does the package we are born with have in the way we act? This is the most interesting aspect of the question to me because this is what we cannot predict (though external influences will still play a large role; someone had to sit Mozart down in front of a piano). This thing intrigues me particularly when I think that it seems like some people are just born with some talent ( I am thinking now particularly of Bertrand Russell who at the age of 14 could easily understand some intricacies of Euclid which his older brother told him were generally considered quite difficult. I compare him to myself who at 14 still struggled with 1 plus 1). The thing which I now ponder is how much this innate package influences the way we will react to a given situation, because I think it is this that will change the shape of this free will question.

Eric Replies: [Return to Reaction and Comments page] or [Return to Home Page] or [Return to Top of Page]

It is true that human beings must have much in common for inter-subjectivity to work. We have to be able to agree about many things (survival demands it) and this seems to point to commonality and hence, determinism. We have physical commonality and mental commonality, but we also have genetic uniqueness and appear to have mental uniqueness. The problem is to explain how this impression of mental uniqueness can possibly be a true impression, seeing as commonality and uniqueness are usually taken to be mutually exclusive. That's what I'm trying to do on the website. I'm trying to say that we have much in common, but much which is unique, and what is unique ultimately arises from a unique set of experiences in a unique order plus genetic influences which allow for the ordering and re-ordering of experiences in a unique, subjective way making for a unique essential "I". The unique "I" arises partly from experiences in a unique reality-given order, but partly from their storage order in the mind; and hence their influence on the process of "I" will depend on both the genetically unique brain's strengths and weaknesses and on the experiences which the brain chooses to store in the memory and the way they are stored (importance is assigned by the current "I" based upon our innate appreciation of pattern). Such a memory bank is constantly influencing the present through the subconscious generation of emotions and feelings which can be triggered at any moment by present experiences.

Regarding left and right handedness, this is another interesting point. I can remember distinctly at school when I was very young having the pencil taken from my left hand by a helpful teacher, who then put the pencil into my right hand and said: "You'll find it easier this way". I suspect that I was ambidextrous at that point. The run of English writing (left to right) it would seem to me, encourages the use of the right hand, seeing as the use of the left tends to cover the words just written (and smear them, when writing in ink).

I am somewhat confused by your use of the baby illustration. It appears that you are arguing for determinism at that point in your message. May I explain that my own position is that the physical world is determined (in the sense I explain on my website) but that what goes to make up a human being is only partly determined, the essential "I" being created, or developed during the normal growing process. In other words, there are determining factors, but such factors are influential only in so far as the individual chooses them to be. One person is beaten as a child and grows up to be a child beater, for instance. Another person is beaten as a child and swears never to beat his or her own children - and grows up to never beat a child. It seems to me that in such cases there is something which is controlling the response and justifying it internally. Different choices are being made under similar circumstances.

I think you are correct in saying that choices concerning actions to be taken rely on what has gone before. However, this is where the genetic element comes into play. The what-has-gone-before is experience and experience is ordered in the mind subjectively, according to the individual and the individual's brain, its weaknesses and strengths. In other words, as the individual grows, he or she gains control over what will influence and how much it will influence, through the growing self-awareness which comes with time and experience. In recalling experiences, they are not apprehended individually, they overlay previous experiences and interact with them; past experiences are reinterpreted or re-ordered in the light of new experiences (and vice versa), making minor subconscious revisions of the essential "I" constant. Major revisions require greater (often conscious) effort on the part of the individual, or a rare experience which changes an outlook completely in an instant (epiphany).

Raul Ramirez Writes: [Return to Reaction and Comments page] or [Return to Home Page] or [Return to Top of Page]

The baby illustration was the only true exhibition of free will I could think of (more than likely a bad one), as at this point it has had no external influences acting on it and it's will is as free as it is going to get.

I am very interested in your idea(s) about the ordering and re-ordering of knowledge, experience, etc, and if I am not mistaken it has somewhat of a Kantian flavour to it. Based on this ordering and re-ordering, won't a lot of the character of the person still rest a great deal on their very earliest experiences? For instance, if I acquire some new piece of wisdom I will choose whether to accept/dismiss it on my already existing 'mental package', which was formed out of a different pre-existing package? This would no doubt go back to very early childhood, making early influences the most significant because this will be your first 'mental package' and will shape what you dismiss/accept in two days time, which will in turn shape what dismiss/accept in a week, a month, a year and a decade.

What do you think is responsible for the mental uniqueness? Does it come from the parents? Must the parents have the same mental uniqueness or can it skip a generation or lie dormant in someone? I am very interested in this point, the 'innate abilities' I talked about I think are much the same as what you are calling 'mental uniqueness'.

Eric Replies: [Return to Reaction and Comments page] or [Return to Home Page] or [Return to Top of Page]

I'm interested to see that you perceive Kant's influence in my ideas. It is true that Kant maintained that time, space and causality are imposed upon experience by the organising mind. Although I agree that such organising is mental and is a facility arising from the brain, I have introduced evolution into the argument. Kant rejected idealism and maintained that there was a real "thing in itself", but he also maintained that we could not know anything about the nature of the thing in itself. I am not so sure about this myself. I maintain that the forces of evolution have shaped us for survival, and that, therefore, our view of the thing in itself is authentic. It is simply not the only way to view it (other life forms have other means of perception - see the Richard Dawkins link in the Appearance and Reality section of the Nature of Truth webpage - bat analogy).

Earliest experiences will have an importance that can be overestimated. It is true that the initial experiences will serve to begin the establishment of the essential "I", turning a capacity into a capability, but we should not forget mental flexibility and the proposal I have made concerning the constant development of this mental entity (in fact, I prefer the description "event-process" as a more accurate term when dealing with the development of such amorphous things as the essential "I"). If I am correct in saying that experiences are constantly interacting and overlaying previous experiences, then such interaction must be changing our view of the original impressions, whether they are our earliest or not, as more data comes to hand for comparison. The "I" is not static, although it may well harbour a belief that is it and may well endeavour to make itself static. It is, in fact, a process.

We should be careful not be two-dimensional in conceiving of our view of the nature of the essential "I". The acceptance or rejection of a piece of wisdom does not depend entirely upon what has gone before, seeing as what went before had an order which was determined by a context composed of our temporal and spatial position and physical conditions (our own and the environment's). Once within the mind, such ordering can be rearranged. In our minds we can run time backwards, slow it down, we can see patterns and compare and contrast in ways not open to us during the actual capture of the original perception. We are also open to persuasion. A well made argument can change our minds. This involves the use of mental tools like logic, which have arisen from the evolution-developed pattern-seeking strategy I propose as inherent within the physical structures of the brain. The existing mental package, then, is not set in stone. Indeed, in order to exist at all, it must be open to new impressions and must incorporate them continuously, otherwise how could it arise in the first place?

What we hold in common arises from a shared physiology, but because of genetic individuality and the unique nature of individual experiences, we are all different and therefore unique. This doesn't mean that no two people can be alike, but it does mean that no two people will be identical. Genetic twins can be physically alike, and may also be close as regards mentality, but I maintain that no matter how close the match may be, they cannot logically be one person in two places at the same time and will therefore have some variation in experience which will make them different in some respects. It is a moot point as to whether such differences are significant. For me, they are.

Raul Ramirez Writes: [Return to Reaction and Comments page] or [Return to Home Page] or [Return to Top of Page]

I have never wished to say that the mind is static. I am quite certain my mentality now is not the same as it was when I was three years of age, so I would be foolish to try and maintain that the mind is static. I still think, though, that earliest influences must play a great role in our development later on.

Apropos arguing and logic, have you ever argued with someone who quite simply does not abide by the 'unspoken contract' (the duty of a participant to concede a good point and to be civil and not too dogmatic in their argument)? For some people a good argument will not do no matter how logical or well constructed it is. To illustrate (though I don't like to get too political on a philosophy issue) look at Tony Blair or George Bush at the moment; they speak endlessly about bringing 'freedom' and 'democracy' to Iraq and totally ignore the real issues, meaning even if you sat Noam Chomsky down in front of them they would not concede a good point.

Obviously people are open to persuasion, but usually because of their existing mental framework, they will not want to know about anything that challenges their view of the world. If they are open to persuasion, it is probably again because of early influences that have made them more open minded.

Eric Replies: [Return to Reaction and Comments page] or [Return to Home Page] or [Return to Top of Page]

Yes, our earliest experiences will have great importance, due to their endurance through time. We maintain them by remembering them periodically to refresh the mental copy we hold stored in the memory, and so must regard them with a certain attachment due a feeling of familiarity at each refresh. Such familiarity will prompt concomitant emotions of security and a sense of self knowledge and continuity in our identity. The main reason I emphasised that the importance of such memories can be exaggerated is due to the influence of Freud and the work of those following Freud. I think that Freud's theories concerning the mind cloak themselves with the kudos of science and are understood as science by many. This view of Freud's work as scientific I disagree with, because I believe such theories give too great a weight to early experiences, thus oversimplifying the workings of the mind, although I acknowledge that such early experiences are important and have a special type of influence. The difference is, I do not see the influence of such experiences as being decisive in determining all (or even most) motivation.

Of course, I have met people who will not engage fairly in open logical argument. However, I must admit that I don't see how any human mind can possibly be completely open, because to engage in discussion of any kind, or to even generate the essential "I" itself, one must maintain some mental elements as set, otherwise that which perceives would have no sense of self due to a lack of any mental structure. Some people, it seems to me, attempt to hold on to the same groups and groupings of set mental elements (Self love as an established mental pattern which must be maintained at all costs) whilst others see no threat in changing selected set elements over time, transforming some formerly taken to be immutable into fluid entities, whilst taking other elements formerly apprehended as fluid as being for the moment focussed and defined for the sake of the emergence of the current "I". In other words, the "I" is a self-creating and self-revising mental entity. It can proceed by struggling to maintain a set pattern or it can be in a state of constant revision. I tend to believe that most of us go through both these positions in varying degrees as we grow up, but that we spend most of our adult lives in a broadly-speaking middle state, not making radical changes but not attempting to hold the current pattern completely static and intact, particularly in fringe areas which we perceive as unimportant to essential Self.

It is also true that many people argue almost entirely from emotion. They take their own feelings as their propelling force in the process of the "I". People who "feel" certain can be the most dangerous of all. On the other hand, those with only logic can be reduced to impotence when it comes to initiating a course of action. People tend to be persuaded by logical argument but motivated by emotion.